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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

Case No. 20922

ADOLPHO DIAZ MENDOZA and
ALBERTO RUIZ MENDIETAf
Defendants-Respondents.

STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1.

Did the trial court fail to follow the requirements

of Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) in granting defendants1 motions to
suppress?
2.

Did the trial court apply an incorrect standard of

law in determining that the stop of defendants1 vehicle was
unlawful?
3.

Did the trial court incorrectly rule that

defendants had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle
they were driving?
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Defendants, Adolfo Diaz Mendoza and Alberto Ruiz
Mendieta, were charged by information with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, a third
degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1) (a)(ii) (Supp.

1985) (RARM. 8; RADM. 9) .*

After a preliminary hearing in the

Ninth Circuit Courtf St. George Department, on April 1, 1985f
both were bound over to stand trial in the Fifth District Court
in Washington County (RARM. 3; RADM. 3). In district court,
defendants filed separate motions to suppress evidence (namely a
substantial amount of marijuana seized from the trunk of the car
they were driving) on the ground that the evidence was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (RARM. 27-28; RADM. 14-15).

After a hearing on July

12, 1985, the district court granted defendants1 motions (RARM.
89-90; RADM. 52-3; Appendix A ) .

Because the State could not

proceed without the suppressed evidence, it petitioned for and
received an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order in
this Court.

After the district court set a trial date for

defendants, this Court ordered the trial stayed until resolution
of the State's interlocutory appeal.
STATEMENT QF FACTS
At the hearing on defendants' motions to suppress in
district court, the following evidence was presented.
At approximately 4:45 a.m. on March 16, 1985, two U.S.
Immigration Service border patrol officers were in a marked
patrol vehicle parked in the median between the northbound and
southbound lanes of 1-15 near St. George, Utah.

They observed a

black Ford Mustang automobile traveling north which bore
California license plates and contained persons who appeared to
1

References to "RARM." are to the record in the Mendieta case;
references to "RADM." are to the record in the Mendoza case.

-2-

be Mexican.

The officers pulled onto the freeway behind the

Mustang, accelerated to a high speed, and eventually caught up
with the vehicle as it drove in the passing lane.

They remained

several feet behind the Mustang for a short time before it pulled
over into the right-hand lane and decelerated rapidly (S.H. 49,
52-4) . 2
The officers twice pulled alongside the Mustang to
observe its occupants.

The driver and the passenger, who like

the driver looked Mexican, appeared to be extremely nervous.
They studiously shunned eye contact with the officers and
exhibited a rigid response to their presence which, according to
one officer, was not "typical behavior11 (S.H. 57-60).

The other

officer testified that the driver had a "white-knuckle kind of
look" which suggested that he was not at all relaxed (S.H. 116).
After making these observations with the assistance of
lights in a rest area, the officers turned on the red lights of
their patrol car and stopped the Mustang to determine whether it
contained illegal aliens.

Short conversations with the driver

and passenger, who were defendants, revealed that neither
possessed any documents to show that he was legally in the United
States.

Defendant Mendoza, who wore a Mexican poncho, admitted

that he was an illegal alien.

The officers arrested both

defendants and then opened the Mustang's trunk, which was large
enough to hold a person, to ascertain whether it contained any
illegal aliens.

In the trunk the officers discovered numerous

2 References to "S.H." are to the transcript of the suppression
hearing.
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plastic bags filled with marijuana (S.H. 58, 61-7, 119, 126A,
129) .
Both officers, who had eight and seven years of infield experience with the border patrol, testified that there
were essentially seven factors upon which they relied in stopping
defendants1 vehicle:

(1) defendants1 Mexican physical features;

(2) the route of travel (i.e., 1-15 is commonly used by illegal
aliens from Mexico traveling north from the border between the
United States and Mexico); (3) the time of day that defendants
were traveling (i.e., early morning when it was still dark); (4)
the time of year (the month of March is a peak period of illegal
alien traffic from Mexico with the end of winter and the
beginning of planting season); (5) the California plates on the
vehicle (California being a state that shares a border with
Mexico); (6) the erratic manner in which the car was driven; and
(7) the extreme nervousness of defendants (S.H. 47, 51-60, 100,
118).

One officer further testified that with similar facts

presented to him in previous situations, particularly the extreme
nervousness of the vehicle's occupants, he had never stopped such
a vehicle and had the occupants turn out to be anything but
illegal aliens (S.H. 89).
Defendant Mendoza testified to the following facts.
The day before he was arrested near St. George, Mendoza borrowed
a black Mustang from a friend in Los Angeles and drove to Las
Vegas that evening to do some gambling.

That same evening while

still in Las Vegas, Mendoza attempted to call his friend in Los
Angeles to ask for permission to drive defendant Mendieta, a

-4-

friend of Mendoza1s who was in Las Vegasf to Colorado.

The

purpose of the trip to Colorado/ according to Mendozaf was to
pick up Mendieta's gravely ill mother and either bring her back
to Las Vegas or leave her at Mendieta's sister's house*

Mendieta

had offered Mendoza $100 to pay for gas (S.H. 13-16).
Mendoza reached the owner of the Mustang by telephone
at Mendoza1s home in Los Angeles.

Although Mendoza spoke with

the ownerf the owner was drunk and could not be understood.
However/ Mendoza spoke with his own brother who told him that the
owner said it was all right to take the car to Colorado/ so long
as Mendoza returned to Los Angeles two days later.

Mendoza, who

was driving at the time defendants were stopped/ admitted that
neither he nor his passenger, Mendieta, owned the Mustang (S.H.
18-30).
After considering the evidence before it and the
State's arguments concerning standing/ the district court granted
defendants' motions to suppress/ ruling that both defendants had
standing to challenge the stop of and subsequent search of the
vehicle they were driving, that "there were no articulable facts
as a basis or probable cause for [the] officers to make the
initial stop of the [d]efendants[f] and that the stop was
conducted in an unreasonable manner" (Transcript of Court's
Ruling on Motion to Suppress at 3-5; RARM. 89-90; RADM. 52-3;
Appendix A ) .

The court denied the State's motion for

reconsideration and clarification of the order granting the
motions to suppress (Transcript of Court Proceedings on Sept. 18,
1985 at 3 ) . The State appeals to this Court from the district
court's suppression order.
-5-

SUMMARY OF ARCTIMENTS

In granting defendants1 motions to suppress, the trial
court failed to comply with the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P.
12(g).

Because that rule embodies a desirable and constitutional

modification of the exclusionary rulef the court's failure to
make the necessary findings under it before suppressing the
challenged evidence should result in a reversal of its
suppression order.
The trial court applied an incorrect standard of law in
ruling that the stop of defendants1 vehicle was unlawful.

Under

the applicable "reasonable suspicion" testf the stop was
constitutional.

Alternatively/ if the stop was not legal,

evidence seized pursuant to it should not have been suppressed
because the officers1 actions did not constitute a "substantial"
violation of defendants1 constitutional rights; nor was the
violation committed in bad faith.

Under Rule 12(g), the evidence

would therefore be admissible.
Finallyf the trial courtfs ruling on standing is
contrary to this Court's recent decision in State v. Valdez, 689
P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) . Because neither defendant owned the car
they were driving or demonstrated a legitimate expectation of
privacy in that car, they lack standing to challenge the search
of the car.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS,
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE THE FINDINGS
REQUIRED UNDER UTAH R. CRIM. P. 12(g);
THEREFORE, ITS ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED.
-6-

Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g)(1) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-3512(g)(1)) provides:
In any motion concerning the
admissibility of evidence or the suppression
of evidence pursuant to this section or at
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and
seizure, the suppression of evidence shall
not be granted unless the court finds the
violation upon which it is based to be both a
substantial violation and not committed in
good faith. The court shall set forth its
reasons for such finding.
£££ AlStt UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-12 (1982) and UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-16-1 and -5 (Supp. 1985).

In its order granting

defendants1 motions to suppress (Appendix A) the trial court did
not make the findings regarding "a substantial violation" and
"good faith" that are required under Rule 12(g)(1).

It ruled

only "that there were no articulable facts as a basis or probable
cause for [the] officers to make the initial stop of the
[dlefendants and that the stop was conducted in an unreasonable
manner."

The court subsequently refused to modify that order

even though the State asked it to make and set forth the reasons

for the findings required under Rule 1 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) .

gee S t a t e ' s

Motion For Reconsideration and Clarification (RARM. 65-8; RADM.
44-7).
There can be little dispute that the trial court
effectively ignored the specific requirements of Rule 12(g)(1)
when it suppressed the challenged evidence.

The obvious purpose

of that rule is to avoid the operation of the exclusionary rule
where the unlawful search or seizure was neither substantial nor
committed in bad faith.

Therefore, a court must only suppress

evidence in accordance with the policy expressly embodied in Rule

-7-

12(g). £££ alSLQ §§ 77-23-12, 78-16-1 and -5; Utah R. Evid. 402
(Supp. 1985).

Because the trial court here completely failed to

do that, this Court should reverse its order granting defendants1
suppression motions and enter the findings argued for by the
State in Points II or III, iufxa.

Although the discussion on

this question could end here, the State, recognizing that this
Court has never specifically ruled upon the constitutionality of
Utahfs statutory "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule,
£&£ State Vt Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985), will
address that issue below.
A.

The Federal Constitution

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Nearly identical language appears in article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.

Recently, in United States v. Leon,

U.S.

, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), the United States Supreme Court
fashioned an objective good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.

Recognizing that the exclusionary rule "operates as 'a

judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect [on police
misconduct], rather than a personal constitutional right of the
person aggrieved,1" 104 S.Ct. at 3412, quoting United States V,
Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), the Court held that the
-8-

prosecution may use in its case-in-chief evidence obtained by
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued
by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be
unsupported by probable cause.

In so holding, the Court

concluded that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the
substantial costs of exclusion."

104 S.Ct. at 3421. The Court

cited with approval the following language from various cases:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule necessarily assumes that the police have
engaged in willful, or at the very least
negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right. By refusing to
admit evidence gained as a result of such
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those
particular investigating officers, or in
their future counterparts, a greater degree
of care toward the rights of an accused.
Where the official conduct was pursued in
complete good faith, however, the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force."
104 S.Ct. at 3419, citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447

(1974); united States v. Peltier. 422 u.s. 531, 539 (1975).
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is
to deter unlawful police conduct, then
evidence obtained from a search should be
suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may
properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment."
104 S.Ct. at 3419-20, £itina Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542.
In short, where the officer's conduct is
objectively reasonable,
"excluding the evidence will not further
the ends of the exclusionary rule in any
appreciable way; for it is painfully
apparent that . . . the officer is

-9-

acting as a reasonable officer would and
should act under the circumstances.
Excluding the evidence can in no way
affect his future conduct unless it is
to make him less willing to do his
duty."
104 S.Ct. at 3420f siting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465f 539-40
(1976) (White, J., dissenting).
Although Lean, and its companion case, Massachusetts Y»
Sheppardf

U.S.

, 104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984)f were decided in

the context of reasonable reliance by police officers on a
warrant approved by a magistrate, there is nothing in either of
those decisions to indicate that the good faith exception could
not also properly apply in warrantless situations.
Lopez-Mendoza,
J., dissenting).

U.S.

See I.N.S. v.

, 104 S.Ct. 3479f 3493 (1984) (White,

In fact, the Court's general discussion about

the propriety of a good faith exception strongly suggests that
such an extension of L^&n would be acceptable and desirable.

For

instance, in LJQQR the Court at one point states:
[EJven assuming that the rule effectively
deters some police misconduct and provides
incentives for the law enforcement profession
as a whole to conduct itself in accord with
the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected,
and should not be applied, to deter
objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity.
104 S.Ct. at 3419.
Significantly,

a number of c o u r t s have adopted a form

of good f a i t h e x c e p t i o n t o t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e i n a w a r r a n t l e s s
s e a r c h or s e i z u r e c o n t e x t .

.£££, e t g . r United S t a t e s v , Owens,

607 F. Supp. 140, 144-6 (D.C. O k l a . 1 9 8 3 ) ; United S t a t e s v .
Wyler. 502 F.Supp. 969, 973-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1 9 8 0 ) .

-10-

The l e a d i n g case

appears to be United States v, Williamsr 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.
1980) (en banc) , cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) , where the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence seized from the
defendant incident to a warrantless arrest, which was ultimately
determined to have been unlawful, should not be excluded because
"evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule
where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that
are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken,
belief that they are authorized."

622 F.2d at 840. The court

analyzed the appropriateness of a good faith exception in much
the same way that the Supreme Court did in Leon, emphasizing that
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is not furthered
if the rule is applied to situations where police officers have
acted in the good faith belief that their conduct is lawful. 622
F.2d at 842. Numerous courts have cited Williams with approval.

E.g. United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146 (loth cir. 1985);
Donovan v, Federal Clearing Die Casting Co.f 695 F.2d 1020 (7th
Cir. 1982); United States v, Nolan, 530 F.supp. 386 (W.D. pa.
1981), afiid, 718 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1983); State v. Verkuylen,
120 Wis.2d 59, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. App. 1982); State v. Glass, 9
Ohio Misc.2d 10, 458 N.E.2d 1302 (Ohio Com. PI. 1983).

In short,

the Williams opinion embodies the logical extension of Lesm into
the area of warrantless searches and seizures.

It is difficult

to conceive of any compelling reason why the Supreme Court would
not apply the Leon rule in a case where an officer's warrantless
conduct, subsequently determined to be in violation of the fourth
amendment, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

-11-

£££ Bloom, United S t a t e s v. Leon And I t s Ramifications. 56 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 247, 259-61 (1985); but see People v. C i r a o l o . 161
Cal.App.3d 1081 f 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 f 95 (Cal. App. 1984)

(stating

t h a t Leon has no a p p l i c a t i o n to w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h e s ) , c e r t .
granted. 105 S.Ct. 2672 (1985).
Upon examining Leon and Williams, i t l o g i c a l l y follows
t h a t Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) f which appears to be l i t t l e more than
a c o d i f i c a t i o n of the good f a i t h exceptions t o the exclusionary
r u l e fashioned in Laan and Williams, i s not u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
under the federal c o n s t i t u t i o n .

JS££ People v. Deitchman, 695

P.2d 1146, 1153 (Colo. 1985) (Erickson, C.J. f

concurring)

(observing t h a t Colorado's s t a t u t o r y "good f a i t h " exception to
the exclusionary r u l e i s c o n s i s t e n t with fourth amendment
precedent and does not v i o l a t e federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s ) .
So long as Rule 12(g) i s applied in a manner c o n s i s t e n t with the
objective standard of reasonableness adopted by the Supreme
Court f Lsjon, 104 S.Ct. a t 3420 n. 20, Utah's s t a t u t o r y good f a i t h
exception i s not contrary to federal law.
B.

The Utah Constitution

The further question of whether Rule 12(g) is contrary
to article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution remains.
Historically, this Court has decided search and seizure issues by
applying federal precedents developed under the fourth amendment.
£££r e.g.. State v. Gallegos. 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1985); S±&t£
v. Harris. 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983); fitate v. Romero. 660 P.2d
715 (Utah 1983).

The federal version of the exclusionary rule

has consistently been applied as the sole remedy for a violation
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of an individual's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

See State v. Hygh, 16 Utah

Adv. Rep. 10, 16 (1985) (Zimmerman, J.f concurring separately).
However, as noted by Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion
in Hygh, "tslound arguments . . . can be made against acceptance
of the federal version of the exclusionary rule as the sole
remedy for unlawful searches and seizures," and "ftlhe federal
law as it currently exists is certainly not the only permissible
interpretation of the search and seizure protections contained in
the Utah Constitution."

16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.

Justice

Zimmerman further observed that "this Court has never considered N
the appropriateness of possible exceptions to the exclusionary
rule or the availability of alternative or supplemental remedies,
such as the imposition of civil liability on police officers."

Significantly, Utah is one of but a handful of states
that have enacted a statutory "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule.

§§ 77-35-12(g) and 78-16-5 (Supp. 1985).

See

£L&n ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3925 (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §
16-3-308 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CONST, art. I, § 28(d) (which appears
to eliminate the exclusionary rule for all "relevant" evidence);
S. 237 (a bill now pending in Congress—see also S. 1764, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S1066 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1984),
an identical bill which passed the full Senate in 1984 by a vote
3

The wisdom of the exclusionary rule has frequently been the
subject of debate among commentators. £L££ State v. Bolt, 142
Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519, 528 n. 1 (1984) (Cameron, Justice,
specially concurring).
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of 63-24) .4

Admittedly, the statutes in other states have not

been free from criticism.

S££r

e.g., Strossf The Colorado

Statutory Good-Faith Exception To The Exclusionary RuL^i h Step
Too Far?, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 809 (1982).

However, commentary on

Dtahfs Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1982, 1982 Utah Lawsf
Chap. 10, §§ 1-16, which addedf inter aliaf § 77-35-12(g) and §§
78-16-1 through -11, has generally been favorable. S£& Comment,
1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 138-46; Comment, 9 J. Contemp. L. 171
(1983).

What distinguishes the Utah scheme from those in the

other states noted is that it provides both an appropriate
modification of the exclusionary rule and a civil remedy for the
defendant whose constitutional rights have been violated.

An

excellent outline of the Act's provisions appears in 9 J.
Contemp. L. at 184-5:
The Utah Act waives the statutory
immunity from suit that governmental entities
are able to invoke for injuries "proximately
caused or arising out of a violation of
protected fourth amendment rights." It
provides a cause of action for damages to
injured parties against the peace officer who
violates their fourth amendment rights and/or
the officer's employing agency.
Under the Act, the offending officer and
the officer's employing agency are jointly
and severally liable for damages if the
violation is negligent. The officer alone is
liable for damages "filf the violation [is]
substantial, grossly negligent, willful, or
malicious . . . unless the violation [is] the
result of a general order of the agency.
When the search or seizure is committed
intentionally but in good faith, the
employing agency alone is liable for damages.
The Act provides that an injured party
4

Appendix B contains the text of each of the state provisions
and the proposed federal law.
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may sue to recover nominal damages in the
amount of $100 plus any costs and attorneys'
fees. In addition, the victim of an illegal
search or seizure may recover "actual
damages, including but not limited to injury
to person, propertyf or reputation." If the
violation is "substantial, grossly negligent
willful, or malicious," the Act provides that
recovery may include, in addition to nominal
and actual damages, exemplary or punitive
damages. The Act specifically excludes
recovery of damages for injuries "resulting
from a conviction and judgment . . .
including incarceration, fines, or
restitution." The Act provides for a cause
of action and the recovery of damages in lieu
of the exclusion of otherwise admissible
evidence in criminal cases.
The statutory cause of action and the
ability to recover nominal, actual, and
punitive damages is provided in lieu of the
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence in
most circumstances. However, the
exclusionary rule may still be applied under
the Utah Act when a fourth amendment
violation is both "substantial" and not
committed in "good faith." Evidence gained
in this manner can be suppressed at any stage
of the criminal proceeding. An individual
whose rights are violated substantially and
in bad faith, may elect either to exclude the
evidence or to sue for damages. When the
individual chooses to have the evidence
suppressed, however, the Act precludes any
additional monetary recovery.
The Act . . . also allows the employing
agency to take administrative or disciplinary
action against an errant officer.
Finally, the Act provides that when
there is a victim of a crime, and the
convicted criminal is awarded damages based
on a fourth amendment violation, the victim
of the original crime is entitled to a lien
against the convicted criminal1s award as
restitution. [Footnote citations to relevant
statutes omitted.]
Unlike the laws in other states, Utah's Act more
closely resembles the legislative substitute for the exclusionary
rule suggested by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
-15-

There, he outlined the following requirements:
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to
the illegal acts of law enforcement officials
committed in the performance of assigned
duties;
(b) the creation of a cause of action
for damages sustained by any person aggrieved
by conduct of governmental agents in
violation of the Fourth Amendment or statutes
regulating official conduct;
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasijudicial in nature or perhaps patterned after
the United States Court of Claims, to
adjudicate all claims under the statute:
(d) a provision that this statutory
remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of
evidence secured for use in criminal cases in
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and
(e) a provision directing that no
evidence, otherwise admissible, shall be
excluded from any criminal proceeding because
of violation of the Fourth Amendment.
403 U.S. at 422-3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

Beyond its

substantial compliance with the requirements of the Bivens
dissent, the Utah Act appears to be the kind of modification of
the exclusionary rule that the concurring justices in Hygh would
find acceptable.

In short, it strikes a reasonable balance

between competing interests by applying the exclusionary rule in
a criminal case only when that rule is most likely to have its
desired deterrent effect and awarding civil damages to those
whose rights have been violated.
interests are protected:

Two important societal

valid and trustworthy evidence that

will lead a factfinder to the truth is not excluded in criminal
trials, and one deprived of an important constitutional right is
compensated for that wrong.
The legislature of this state, which presumably enacts
only that legislation it believes to be constitutional under both
the federal and state constitutions, has spoken on the issue of
-16-

modifying the exclusionary rule in criminal cases by enacting the
Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1982.
adopted Rule 12(g) when, in In Re;

This Court implicitly

Rules Pf Procedurer 18 Utah

Adv. Rep. 3 (1985), it adopted all existing statutory rules of
procedure not inconsistent with procedural rules previously
adopted by the Court.

See Hygh, 16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16

(Zimmerman, J., concurring specially) ("I have found no case in
which this Court has decided to adopt the exclusionary rule after
independently analyzing the question of what remedy is available
for unlawful search or seizure under our state constitution").
Moreover, rules of procedure are not solely the province of the
judiciary in this state; the Utah Constitution allows the
legislature to modify procedural rules promulgated by this Court.
UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 4.

Given the compelling policy

arguments supporting the application of Rule 12(g), which
operates in conjunction with §§ 78-16-1 through -11, this Court
should not interpret the Utah Constitution so as to invalidate
that rule.

Although in other instances it may be appropriatef

there is no good reason here to construe article If section 14
more narrowly than the federal courts have the fourth amendment.
2£& State V. Westlung, 705 P.2d 208, 216-7 (Or. App. 1985) (Van
Hoomissenf J., concurring in part; dissenting in part).

By

recognizing that Rule 12(g) is applicable in criminal cases and
constitutional under the state constitution, the Court will not
effectively gut the protections provided in article lf section
14—the scope of which may or may not be congruent with the scope
of fourth amendment protections.

What will constitute a
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"substantial" violation under Rule 12(g) necessarily depends on
what course the Court decides to take in developing future search
and seizure law in Utah.

The Court could develop a jurisprudence

of state constitutional law to replace the sometimes confusing
federal precedents in this area.

Hygh, 16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15-

16 (Zimmerman, J., concurring specially).

"Clear-cut rules" that

guidef rather than befuddle, government officials could be
fashioned by interpreting the search and seizure provisions in
Utahfs constitution differently than the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the fourth amendment, if this Court thinks
it necessary in order to avoid "imperilling] both the rights of
individuals and the integrity and effectiveness of law
enforcement."

Xbid.

Thus, recognition of Rule 12(g) as both a

desirable and constitutional component of Utah law is the first
step toward a more sensible approach to enforcement of the
criminal laws without compromising an individuals rights under
the fourth amendment and article I, section 14.
In conclusion, the Court should hold that Rule 12(g) is
not only constitutional, but also the controlling rule in all
criminal cases when the question of suppression of evidence for
an allegedly unlawful search or seizure is presented.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT STANDARD
OF LAW IN DETERMINING THAT THE STOP OF
DEFENDANTS' VEHICLE WAS UNLAWFUL. UNDER THE
PROPER STANDARD, THE OFFICERS1 STOP OF THE
VEHICLE WAS LEGAL. ALTERNATIVELY, THE STOP
WAS NEITHER A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF
DEFENDANTS1 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS NOR A
VIOLATION COMMITTED IN BAD FAITH.
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In holding that the stop of defendants1 vehicle was
unlawful, which provided the sole basis for suppressing the
challenged evidence, the trial court applied an incorrect
standard of law.

It ruled that "there were no articulable facts

as a basis or probable cause for [the] officers to make the
initial stop of [defendants* (emphasis added).

When determining

whether an investigatory stop of an automobile, like that at
issue here, is lawful, the court must ask whether the police
officers acted upon "reasonable suspicion," not "probable cause."

United States v. Cortez, 449 u.s. 411 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 u.s. 648 (1979); United States Vt Brignoni-Ponger 422 u.s.
873 (1975); State v, Swanigan, 699 p.2d 718 (Utah 1985); state v,
£iks£nr 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983).

Clearly, this was not the

standard applied by the trial court when it suppressed the
evidence seized pursuant to the stop.
are presented:

Therefore, two questions

(1) under the "reasonable suspicion" test was the

stop of defendants1 vehicle legal? and (2) if the stop was
illegal, was the evidence seized pursuant to it still admissible
under Utah R. Crim P. 12(g)?5
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment "forbids stopping or detaining
persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a
5

For purposes of addressing these questions, the State will
assume, arguendo, that defendants have standing to challenge the
search of the vehicle they were driving, whether or not the
initial stop was lawful. In Point III, infra, the State argues
that defendants do not have standing to challenge the search of
the car; however, that argument presumes the legality of the
initial stop. Thus, the State addresses the issue regarding the
legality of the stop prior to the standing issue.
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reasonable suspicion t h a t they may be a l i e n s . "

422 U.S. at 884.

"Officers on roving p a t r o l may stop v e h i c l e s only if they are
aware of s p e c i f i c a r t i c u l a b l e f a c t s f

together with r a t i o n a l

inferences from those f a c t s , t h a t reasonably warrant suspicion
t h a t the v e h i c l e s contain a l i e n s who may be i l l e g a l l y in the

country." xfcid.; £££

.SLSG

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at

417-18; state Vt Swaniganf 699 p.2d at 719; state v» Gibson, 665
P.2d a t 1304.

A number of f a c t o r s may be taken i n t o account in

forming a reasonable suspicion:
Officers may consider the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of
the area in which they encounter a v e h i c l e .
I t s proximity to the border, the usual
p a t t e r n s of t r a f f i c on the p a r t i c u l a r road,
and previous experience with a l i e n t r a f f i c
are a l l r e l e v a n t . See Carroll v. United
£tai££f 267 U.S. 132, 159-161 (1925); United

States Vt Jaime-Barriosf 494 F.2d 455 (CA9),

c e r t , denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974). They also
may consider information about recent i l l e g a l
border crossing in the area. The d r i v e r ' s
behavior may be r e l e v a n t , as e r r a t i c driving
or obvious attempts t o evade o f f i c e r s can
support a reasonable s u s p i c i o n . .£££ United-

States Vt Larios-Montesr 500 F.2d 941 (CA9

1974); Duprez v. United S t a t e s , 435 F.2d 1276
(CA9 1970). Aspects of the v e h i c l e i t s e l f
may j u s t i f y suspicion. For i n s t a n c e ,
o f f i c e r s say t h a t c e r t a i n s t a t i o n wagons,
with large compartments for fold-down s e a t s
or spare t i r e s , are frequently used for
t r a n s p o r t i n g concealed a l i e n s . .&££ United

States v. Burgarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (CA9

1 9 7 3 ) , c e r t , d e n i e d , 414 U . S . 1136 (1974);

United States v> Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (CAS

1973). The v e h i c l e may appear to be heavily
loaded, i t may have an extraordinary number
of passengers, or the o f f i c e r s may observe
persons t r y i n g to h i d e . £££ United S t a t e s v.
Larios-Montes, £U£ia. The Government also
p o i n t s out t h a t t r a i n e d o f f i c e r s can
recognize the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c appearance of
persons who l i v e in Mexico, relying on such
f a c t o r s as the mode of dress and h a i r c u t .
Reply Brief for United S t a t e s 12-13, in
United S t a t e s v. O r t i z , postr p . 891. in a l l
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situations the officer is entitled to assess
the facts in light of his experience in
detecting illegal entry and smuggling. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 27.
422 U.S. at 884-5.

Although the courts have not always been in agreement
as to what a r t i c u l a b l e f a c t s are s u f f i c i e n t to support a
reasonable suspicion in t h i s context, .S££, e . g . > United S t a t e s v.
Varela-Andujo, 746 F.2d 1046 (5th C i r . 1984)

(sufficient

a r t i c u l a b l e f a c t s to j u s t i f y s t o p ) ; United S t a t e s v. MelendezGonzalez, 727 P.2d 407 (5th C i r . 1984) (fact t h a t car riding low
and t r a v e l l i n g 50 yards behind truck on sparsely t r a v e l l e d road
60 miles from border not enough); United S t a t e s v. Saenz F 578
P.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1978), ££x£. ifenjjeja, 439 U.S. 1075 (stop
upheld where v e h i c l e s t r a v e l l e d in tandem fashion for about an
hour and driver appeared nervous); United S t a t e s v. Lamas, 608
P.2d 547 (5th C i r . 1979) (fact t h a t occupants of car avoided eye
contact "cannot weigh in the balance in any way") (compare United
S t a t e s v. Barnard, 553 F.2d 389 (5th C i r . 1977) (stop upheld, one
factor being t h a t driver glanced repeatedly and nervously at
border p a t r o l officer and then drove e r r a t i c a l l y ) ) , 6 the
a r t i c u l a b l e f a c t s a v a i l a b l e to the o f f i c e r s in the i n s t a n t case
amounted to a reasonable suspicion to j u s t i f y the stop of
defendants t o i n q u i r e about t h e i r c i t i z e n s h i p .

When the seven

f a c t o r s r e l i e d upon by the o f f i c e r s in making the stop (which are
0

For further discussion of and a u t h o r i t y for what c o n s t i t u t e s
reasonable suspicion in t h i s context, see Comment, 10 Am. J.
Crim. L. 245 (1982); LAFAVE, SEARCH and SEIZURE § 10.5 (1978 and
Supp. 1985).
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noted in this brief's statement of facts, supra at 4) are taken
together and considered in light of those officers' extensive
experience with the border patrol, see Cortez; Brierley v.
Schoenfeld.

F.2d

, Case No. 85-1332, slip op. at 8 (10th

Cir. 1986), one should conclude that the stop was lawful under
the "reasonable suspicion" test.

Accordingly, this Court should

rule that the trial court not only applied an incorrect legal
standard, but also erred in concluding that the stop was
unconstitutional and that the evidence seized pursuant to the
stop must be suppressed.
Even if the Court were to find that the stop was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion, the evidence seized pursuant
to the stop was still admissible under Rule 12(g).

At the very

least, this case presents a close question on whether a
reasonable suspicion existed.

Given the sometimes irreconcilable

differences in court decisions in this area, and the absence of
any Utah case law specifically dealing with a similar factual
situation, the officers' act of stopping defendants under the
circumstances presented certainly would not constitute a
"substantial" violation of defendants' rights under the fourth
amendment and article I, section 14. ite£ Rule 12(g)(2).

To the

contrary, their actions constituted only a minor violation
reflecting reasonable law enforcement activity that should not
result in the exclusion of substantial, reliable evidence. S&&
United States v. Leon.

U.S.

, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984);

United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), ££x£^ jaenifidr 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); £f. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that, in civil
-22-

rights actions, government officials "are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known").

There being no evidence of

bad faith on the part of the officers, SSLSL Rule 12(g)(3), if this
Court finds the stop was invalid, it should rule that the
suppressed evidence was, nevertheless, admissible under Rule
12(g).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT DEPENDANTS HAD
STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THE
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE THEY WERE DRIVING IS
CONTRARY TO STATE V. VALDEZ, 6 8 9 P . 2 d 1 3 3 4
(UTAH 1 9 8 4 ) .

In granting defendants1 motions to suppress, the trial
court ruled that both defendants "had standing to raise the issue
of the constitutionality and legality of the stop, search and
seizure in that the evidence was unrebutted that the owner of
said vehicle had given his permission to Defendant Mendoza to be
in and use said vehicle up to and including the time said vehicle
was stopped and seized and that Defendant Mendieta had standing
in the use of the purpose [sic] of the trip and that the
defendants were lawfully and legally in possession of said
automobile against all but the owner thereof and that they had a
valid and lawful expectation of privacy while therein"
(Appendix A ) .

The court based its finding of standing solely on

defendants1 possession of and presence in the vehicle they were
driving, even though neither owned that vehicle.
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This casef on the facts presented to the trial court,
is indistinguishable from State v. Valdez. 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah
1984) . There, a unanimous Court held that the defendant, who did
not own the car which he was driving and which was the object of
the search complained of, lacked standing to complain of the
search which followed a stop made by police officers.

It is

clear from Valdez that mere possession of property, or presence
therein or thereon, without some showing of a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the effects searched is not enough to
gain standing to challenge the search*

Therefore, defendants

who, like Valdez, did not own the car they were driving (but had
simply borrowed it) and did not show any legitimate expectation
of privacy in that car (mere possession not being sufficient),
lack standing to challenge the search of the car and ultimate
seizure of the marijuana, at least not on the basis found by the
trial court.7

^Lalilfiz, 689 P.2d at 1335, citing State v. Purcell,

586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should
reverse the trial court's order suppressing the challenged
evidence and remand the case to the district court with an order
to allow admission of that evidence.
7

Although there is some support for the argument that defendants
do not have standing even to object to the allegedly illegal stop
of their car, e.g. Kayes v. State, 409 So*2d 1075 (Fla. App.
1981) (passenger without standing to object to illegal stop of
vehicle); State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983)
(Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) interpreted as barring
passenger from questioning stop of car) , the State does not
advance that argument here.
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of January,

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

FIFT,0 £»CtAl DST COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY

WRIGHT & MILES
By J. MacArthur Wright
John L. Miles
Attorneys for Defendants
60 North 300 East
P.O. Box 339
St. George, UT 84770
Phone: 628-2612
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

1
1

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

vs.
ALBERTO RUIZ MENDIETA, and
ADOLFO DIAZ MENDOZA,

1
i

Criminal No.

1312 •
1311V^

Defendants.
Defendants, ADOLFO DIAZ MENDOZA and ALBERTO RUIZ
MENDIETA, having filed their Motions to Suppress all items of
evidence, including contraband seized from a Mustang automobile
which Defendant, Mendoza, was driving and in which Defendant,
Mendieta, was riding, and any statements of either party given to
Border Patrol officers, members of the Washington County
Sheriff's Department or any other law enforcement agency
subsequent to the stop, arrest and search of said Defendants and
automobile respectively, and hearing having been held before the
Court on July 12, 1985, and evidence and testimoney having been
introduced and parties having submitted points and authorities,
and the Court having considered the evidence and testimony and
reviewed the authorities submitted by counsel and reviewed the
file and for other good cause appearing, having taken the matter
under advisement, now makes its ruling:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, adjudged and decreed that the
evidence seized by the Washington County Sheriff's officers or
any other law enforcement officers, including but not limited to

suppressed, and any statments made by the Defendants above-named
subsequent to the stop, search, seizure and arrest of Defendants
on or about March 16, 1985, be suppressed for the reason that the
Immigration Officers who made said stop, search and arrest were
engaged in a roving patrol, that there were no articuable facts
as a basis or probable cause for said officers to make the
initial stop of the Defendants and that the stop was conducted in
an unreasonable manner.
IT IS FURTHER found that the Defendants, each and both,
had standing to raise the issue of the constitutionality and
legality of the stop, search and seizure in that the evidence was
unrebutted that the owner of said vehicle had given his
permission to Defendant, Mendoza, to be in and use said vehicle
up to and including the time said vehicle was stopped and seized
and that Defendant Mendieta had standing in the use of the
purpose of the trip and that the defendants were lawfully and
legally in possession of said automobile and had exclusive use
and possession of said automobile against mil but the owner
thereof and that they had a valid and l^xul expectation of
privacy while therein.
DATED this

/ /

day of

985.

mtPK~
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SDPPRESS
to Brent Rowe, County Attorneys Office, 220 North 200 East, St.
George, UT, and also to John E. Meyers, Attorney At Law, at The
Bradbury Building, 304 South Broadway, Suite 432, Los Angeles, CA
on this 16th day of September, 1985

(jOJl LktL

(A l>KVtu^

Sicr r e t a r y f o r
^riLght & M i l e s

APPENDIX B

Arizona

\13-3922

CRIMINAL CODE

iota 1A
ind C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665
WW 57.
L&. Bwrten of proof
If person from whom property was taken chalaoges seizure of items not named in search
varrant, state must establish legality of seizure
if such Hems by preponderance of evidence, and
nay do so by showing that property is unlawful
bo possess, that property is stolen, or by showing
loroe other reason why property is subject to
seizure.
Search Warrants C-419847 and
C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 P.2d
57.
State has burden to prove that property seized
without warrant was nevertheless lawfully
seized under some exception to warrant requirement; if, however, warrant has been issued,
there is presumption that warrant is valid, requisite probable cause having been shown, and it is
then individual's burden to prove invalidity of
search and seizure. Search Warrants C-419847
and C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665
P.2d57.

Unlike challenge to grounds for issuing search
warrant where individual bears burden of proof
state must bear burden once individual establishes that item seized from him is not described is
search warrant Search Warrants C-419847 and
C-419848 v. Stat* (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 P.2d
57.
3. Review
Motion for restoration of seized property, controverting grounds upon which warrants were
issued, was civil in nature, notwithstanding that
pertinent statute, this section, is found in criminal code; order denying motion which disposed
of cause on merits and left no question remaining for judicial determination was civil judgment
appealable as of right to the Court of Appeals
Greehling v. State (1982) 135 Ariz. 498, 662 P.2d
1005.
4. Jurisdiction
Court of appeals has jurisdiction to review
request for relief under this section. Mehrens v.
State (App.1983) 138 Ariz. 458, 675 P.2d 718,
certiorari denied 105 S.Ct 219, 83 LEd.2d 149.

| 13-3925. - Admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of unlawful search or
seizure; definitions
A. If a party in a criminal proceeding seeks to exclude evidence from the trier of fact
because of the conduct of a peace officer in obtaining the evidence, the proponent of the
evidence may urge that the peace officer's conduct was taken in a reasonable, good faith
belief that the conduct was proper and that the evidence discovered should not be kept
from the trier of fact if otherwise admissible.
B. The trial court shall not suppress evidence which is otherwise admissible in a
crimina] proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace
officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation.
C.

In this section:

1. "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.
2.

"Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon:

CRIMINAL CODE
Harmless error 3
bapemchment 4
Probable cause 2
Retroactive effect 1.5
L In general
Probable cause validates warrantle
where there is information sufficient
belief by a reasonable man that an <
being or has been committed. State
(App.1982) 131 Ariz. 563, 643 P.2d 8.
Warrantless search of defendant's t
and opening of closet door in bun I
which illegal alien was hidden was
where officer had received tip that
had chained illegal alien to a tree, o*
observed a large chain around tree
bunkhouse which went through fron
bunkhouse, and defendant consented t
entry into the bunkhouse to see what v
of the chain, in that from position of
actions of defendant, and information
an illegal alien had been chained on th*
a reasonable person could conclude t
alien was still somewhere inside the b
Id.
1.5. Retroactive effect
"Good faith" exception in provisi<
section governing admissibility of ev
tained as result of unlawful search •
which provision became effective Jul:
with no expressed declaration of re
ARTICLE i
| 13-3931.

Search of accused b

Law Review Commentaries
Administrative dormitory inspectio
university. 19 Ariz.L.Rev. 560 (1977)
English criminal justice la it b
ours? 26 Aro.LRev. 507 (1984).

(a) A statute which is subsequently ruled unconstitutional.
(b) A warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake.
(c) A controlling court precedent which is later overruled, unless the court overruling
the precedent orders the new precedent to be applied retroactively.
D. This section shall not be construed to limit the enforcement of any appropriate civil
remedy or criminal sanction in actions pursuant to other provisions of law against any
individual or government entity found to have conducted an unreasonable search or
seizure.
K. This section does not apply to unlawful electronic eavesdropping or wiretapping
Added by Laws 1982, Ch. 161, § 1.
19S2 Reviser*! Note:
Pursuant to authority of | 41-1304.02, "; definitons" was added to the heading of this section.

Library References
Criminal Law ••394.4(1).
CJ.S. Criminal Law § 657(2) et seq.

Croat References
Issuance of warrant, probable cause, see
| 13-3913.

In genera! 1

Notes of Decisions
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Cross References
Bail bond agents,
Bond, see } 20-320.
Place of business and mam*
records, see § 20-319.
| 13-3961.

Offenses not bailab

A. A person in custody shall
presumption p e a t that he is gu
offense.
B. A person in
felony offense and
matter that there
substantial danger

custody shall
the state cert
is clear and
to another pe

California

A r t . 1, § 2 8

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

(c) Right to Safe Schools. All students and staff of public primary,
elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right
to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.
(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of
the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings,
or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether
heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any
existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or
Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall
affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.
(e) Public Safety Bail. A person may be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for capital crimes when the facts are evident or the
presumption great. Excessive bail may not be required. In setting,
reducing or denying bail, the judge or magistrate shall take into consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense
charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the case. Public
safety shall be the primary consideration.
A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's
discretion, subject to the same factors considered in setting bail. However, no person charged with the commission of any serious felony shall
be released on his or her own recognizance.
Before any person arrested for a serious felony may be released on
bail, a hearing may be held before the magistrate or judge, and the
prosecuting attorney shall be given notice and reasonable opportunity to
be heard on the matter.
When a judge or magistrate grants or denies bail or release on a
person's own recognizance, the reasons for that decision shall be stated
in the record and included in the court's minutes.
(f) Use of Prior Convictions. Any prior felony conviction of any
person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall
subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or
enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding. When a prior
felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven
to the trier of fact in open court.
(f) Serious felony. As used in this article, the term "serious felony"
is any crime defined in Penal Code, Section 1192.7(c).
(Added by Initiative Measure, approved by the people, June 8, 1982)
Amendment of Const. Art J, § 12 by Assembly Const.
Amend. No. 14 (1982) was approved by a higher affirmative
vote at the primary election held June 8, 1982 than Initiative
Measure which repealed Const. Art. 1 § 12, and added this
section which included a new provision on "Public Safety
Bail". If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the
same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the
highest affirmative vote shall prevail, see Const. Art. 2, § 10;
Art 18, § I
610
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lings
actions generally, see ( 13-17-102.

1ZURES
rounds. (2) (g) Which is kept,
nsed, or possessed in violation
es involving a serious threat to J
F the whereabouts of or in the •
trrest warrant is outstanding,
jr this section to search for any
t standing.
ded,L.85,p.615, § § 1 , 2 .
nd seizure other than the provisions of
ire, see § 7 of article II of the Colorado
the "Colorado Children's Code", see

n

CONTENT AND SIFF1CIENCY OF
AFFIDAVIT.

Judge must look within the four corners, etc.
In accord with original. See People \.
Undholm. 197 Colo. 270, 591 P.2d 1032 (1979).
Affidavit interpreted with common sense. In
interpreting an affidavit for a search warrant
gnd the execution of the warrant, a common
tense interpretation must be applied People v.
pel Alamo. 624 P.2d 13(M (Colo. 1981).
Affidavit must supph underlying fact.
In accord with original See People v.
Undholm. 197 Colo. 270,591 P.2d 1032 (1979);
People v Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1982)
Identification of wrong street not dispositive
uf affidavits efficacy. Fact that the affidavit
identified the wrong street, which was less
than one block away from the actual location
of the truck to be searched, was not dispositive

of an affidavit's efficac\ People
Del
Alamo. 624 P.2d 13(U (Colo 19811.
For evidence constituting probablt cause. See
People v Lindholm. 197 Colo 270. 59) P 2d
1032 (1979).
Deletion or inaccuracies not fatal, etc.
The fact that some portions of an affidavit
must be stricken because the\ are erroneous.
or that a portion of the evidence relied on for
a finding of probable cause is not proper)>
recorded and ma> not be considered does noi
require the issuing magistrate to ignore the
other information supplied b> the affidavit.
People v. Gable, 647 P.2d 246 (Colo App.
1982).
A search warrant may be based on hearsay,
etc.
In accord with original. See People v.
Lindholm, 197 Colo. 270,591 P.2d 1032 (1979).

16-3-904. Search warrants - contents.
I. Genera) Consideration.
III. Description of Property.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

>n dealing with searches, see 61 Den.
SI (1984).
lied in People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d $84
1981).

16-3-308

Annotator's Bote. For further annotations
concerning search and seizure, see section 7
of article II of the Colorado Constitution and .
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.

ID. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.
Search warrant reasonably specific under circumstances. See People v. Lindholm, 197
Colo. 270, 591 P.2d 1032 (1979).
In determining whether warrant is too general, the nature of the property to be seized
must be considered People v. Lindholm, 197
Colo. 270,591 P.2d 1032 0979); People v. Ball.
639 P.2d 1078 (Colo. 1982); People v. Hill, 690
P.2d 856 (Colo. 1984).

16-3-305. Search warrants - direction - execution and return.
lavit need not be attached to warrant
There is nothing which requires that a
given a warrant must receive a copy of
Jellying affidavit or that a copy thereof
* attached to the copy of the warrant
is served at the time of the search,
v. Papez, 652 P.2d 619 (Colo. App.

Annotator's note. For further annotations
concerning search and seizure, see section 7
of article II of the Colorado Constitution and
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.
Evidence seized in violation of a statutory
provision may be suppressed only if the

documents attached to and incorporated
ffidavit by reference need not be sworn
ratel) and may thus fall within the four
» of the affidavit. People v. Campbell,
:d 1035 (Colo. App. 1983).
I faith basis required to challenge
t affidavits. As conditions to a veracity
testing the truth of averments conin a warrant affidavit, a motion to supmist be supported by one or more
ts reflecting a good faith basis for the
pc and contain a specification of the
statements challenged People v.
639 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1982).
ed in People v. Con well, 649 P. 2d 1099
1982).

16*3-308. Evidence - admissibility - declaration of purpose. (1) Evidence
which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed
by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by
a peace officer, as defined in section 18-1-901 (3) 0), C.R.S., as a result of
a good faith mistake or of a technical violation.
(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section:
(a) "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts or law which if true would be sufficient to constitute
probable cause.
(b) "Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon
a statute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake, or a court precedent which is later overruled.

unauthorized search and seizure violated constitutional restraints on unreasonable searches
and seizures People v. Hamer, 689 P.2d 1147
(Colo. App. 1984).

6-3-308
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To amend title 18 to limit the application of the exclusionary rule.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
22 (legislative day, JANUARY 21), 1985
Mr. THURMOND (for himself, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. HATCH, Mr. ABDNOB, Mr.
JANUABY

DENTON,

Mr.

JOHNSTON, Mr. T'BIBLE, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. EAST, Mr. HELMS, and

CHILES, Mr.

DOMENICI, Mr.

LONG, Mr.

ZOBNISKY, Mr.

Mr.

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary
BOBEN)

A BILL
TO amend title 18 to limit the application of the exclusionary
rule.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Bepresenta-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That this Act may be cited as the "Exclusionary Rule Limi4 tation Act of 1985".
5

SEC. 2. (a) Chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code,

6 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
7 section:

2
1 "§ 3505. Limitation of the fourth amendment exclusionary
2
3

rule
"Except as specifically provided by statute, evidence

4 which is obtained as a result of a search or seizure and which
5 is otherwise admissible shall not be exclused in a proceeding
6 in a court of the United States if the search or seizure was
7 undertaken in a reasonable, good faith belief that it was in
8 conformity with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of
9 the United States. A showing that evidence was obtained
10 pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes
11 prima facie evidence of such a reasonable good faith belief,
12 unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and ma13 terial misrepresentation/'
14

(b) The table of sections of such chapter is amended by

15 adding at the end thereof the following item:
"3505. Limitation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule/'.

